Historian presents new view of D-Day invasion

The Allied invasion of Normandy, which occurred 57 years ago June 6, resulted in terrible casualties for American troops landing at Omaha Beach, as graphically depicted in movies like Saving Private Ryan.

Over the years, many historians have blamed tactical leaders at the battle site for the Omaha Beach disaster. But a UNT historian says most of the tactical leaders opposed the invasion plans from the beginning, and blame should be placed on those at higher levels — the operational and strategic commanders.

Adrian Lewis, associate professor of history, is the author of Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory, which was named an editors' choice in May by the national History Book Club.

Lewis, a former infantry officer and former instructor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, says he decided to write about the Omaha Beach landing after taking West Point cadets to Normandy and walking the beaches along the coast of France.

"I had always thought that the way the Normandy invasion was conducted seemed to violate common sense. A daylight assault against a deliberate defense seemed to me to be the most costly way to assault a beach. However, until I took a look at the ground on which the battle was fought, I could not make a definitive decision," he says.

The rocky cliff terrain of the Normandy beaches confirmed to Lewis that the invasion plan was flawed.

"Omaha Beach is a natural defense," Lewis says."Even had enemy forces not had the time to construct defensive fortifications, it would have been difficult to fight against them."

Lewis originally wrote about Omaha Beach for his doctoral dissertation. He earned his doctoral degree in European and military history from the University of Chicago in 1995, and began turning his dissertation into a book soon afterward.

He says the plan for the Omaha Beach landing tried to combine the best features of British and American amphibious doctrine: surprise and firepower.

British-led amphibious operations, primarily fought in the Mediterranean, were conducted at night on poorly defended beaches in North Africa, Sicily and Salerno. With darkness obscuring ships anchored off the coast, the troops could stun the enemy with a short, intensive bombardment and seize the beaches with minimal firepower, Lewis says.

The Americans, fighting primarily in the Pacific, based most of their tactical operations on daytime landings supported by overwhelming firepower.

"In 1944, battleships, cruisers, destroyers and aircraft required daylight to effectively destroy targets. Radar was useful but incapable of providing the quality of image necessary to engage point targets," Lewis says. "American bombardments in the Pacific typically took days. The accuracy of naval gunfire, shooting during the hours of daylight, was devastating. Naval gunfire saved a lot of American lives in the Pacific."

Initially, plans for the D-day invasion were based on the British idea of finding a soft spot in the German defenses, then establishing and reinforcing a defensive perimeter for the eventual breakout into France.

On Jan. 1, 1944, however, British Gen. Bernard Montgomery relinquished command of the British Eighth Army in Italy to assumed command of the 21st Army Group and thus operational command of ground forces for the invasion of Europe. Instead of believing that the landings must be made in darkness to have tactical surprise, Montgomery believed that fire support provided by air forces and ships would allow troops to land on the beaches during the day.

Montgomery's plan received the support of Gen. Omar Bradley, who was in charge of all American forces, but "none of the tactical commanders wanted to fight the battle according to the plans," Lewis says, adding that he documents the arguments between the tactical and operational commanders in his book.

Great expectations for victory with air power were not met on Omaha Beach during the invasion, since air bombers delayed the release of their bombs to ensure the safety of ground troops. And, because of the high seas and the inability to accurately determine distance and adjust fire, most of the rockets missed their targets, leaving the ground troops vulnerable. The bombs exploded up to three miles behind the beaches, leaving the German defenses intact.

The American battle plan assumed that bombers would make the initial assault on Omaha Beach relatively easy. Lewis says several things hindered the ground soldiers, including the 60 to 90 pounds of weapons and ammunition each had to carry. Many drowned just trying to get to shore.

"This heavy load diminished soldiers' ability to cross the beach under fire," he says.

Rough seas off the coast of Normandy resulted in several landing crafts sinking and in many soldiers becoming seasick, which sapped their energy for combat, Lewis says. In addition, unexpected German fire from shore intimidated some coxswains of the landing crafts, who refused to steer all the way to the beach and forced soldiers to disembark into water over their heads, he says.

"These soldiers found themselves struggling to stay above the water. Some who were weak swimmers, unable to disentangle themselves from their gear, or carrying heavy equipment, drowned. Many who made it to shore arrived without weapons and too exhausted to advance," Lewis says.

The troops were at last able to get off Omaha Beach and onto the cliffs beyond after company and battalion leaders improvised other plans. Offshore naval destroyers moved as close to the beach as possible to provide supporting fire usually supplied by tanks and artillery, and two Ranger battalions scaled the cliffs with rope ladders to destroy two large coastal guns. Soldiers crawled through minefields to cut the wire and provide a path for others to cross to the cliffs.

By the end of June 6, the Americans controlled a section of the Normandy coast 10,000 yards wide and 2,000 to 3,000 yards deep — but had suffered more than 2,000 casualties.

"We should have lost the battle for Omaha Beach," Lewis says. "In the future, no one will be able to argue that the tactical commanders developed a bad plan. If they developed a bad plan, it was because they were directed to produce battle plans that conformed to the operation plan developed by Montgomery. Generals do make mistakes, even very good generals."

BY NANCY KOLSTI nkolsti@unt.edu

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